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WHERE THE WILD THINGS ARE…PROPERLY VALUED: A LOOK 
INTO METHODS USED BY COURTS TO ASSIGN MONETARY 
VALUE TO WILDLIFE 
United States v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2015). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 2Q2.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, guides 
courts in sentencing when the offense involves wildlife.1 In recent years, 
courts have interpreted and applied § 2Q2.1 inconsistently in the 
assignment of monetary value to wildlife for sentencing. Different 
methods of valuing wildlife have included: strict application of valuation 
tables created by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,2 use of the 
offender’s intended profit from the illegal sale of the wildlife,3 use of 
testimony from experts in wildlife rehabilitation,4 and use of taxidermist 
estimations of the costs of acquisition, scientific value and rarity of the 
wildlife involved.5  
                                                 
1 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 (2015). 
2 See U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2015). 
3 See U.S. v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1996). 
4 See Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 925 (8th Cir. 2015). 
5 See U.S. v. Asper, 753 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
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This note will focus on the implications of the recent Bertucci 
decision and whether this decision is reflective of the protection and 
preservation of the Midwest’s environment. The issues in Bertucci raise 
interesting questions as to how the country currently values, and how it 
should value, its wildlife. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2014, Lamar Bertucci plead guilty to the shooting and killing of 
a bald eagle and a rough-legged hawk in violation of 16 U.S.C. §§ 668(a), 
6 707, 7 and 707.8 After Bertucci plead guilty, the district court ordered the 
                                                 
6 16 U.S.C. §668(a) (2012): 
(a) Prohibited acts; criminal penalties: 
Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, without being permitted to do so as provided in this 
subchapter, shall knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the 
consequences of his act take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to 
sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in 
any manner, any bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle, 
or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of 
the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or regulation 
issued pursuant to this subchapter, shall be fined not more than $5,000 
or imprisoned not more than one year or both: Provided, That in the 
case of a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of this section 
committed after October 23, 1972, such person shall be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both: Provided 
further, That the commission of each taking or other act prohibited by 
this section with respect to a bald or golden eagle shall constitute a 
separate violation of this section: Provided further, That one-half of 
any such fine, but not to exceed $2,500, shall be paid to the person or 
persons giving information which leads to conviction: Provided 
further, That nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or 
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transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg 
thereof, lawfully taken prior to June 8, 1940, and that nothing herein 
shall be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any 
golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully 
taken prior to the addition to this subchapter of the provisions relating 
to preservation of the golden eagle. Id. 
7 § 703(a):  
(a) In general 
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter 
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any 
means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to 
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, 
offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, 
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, 
transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or 
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory 
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or 
not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of 
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of 
the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for the 
protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 
1702), the United States and the United Mexican States for the 
protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February 
7, 1936, the United States and the Government of Japan for the 
protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and 
their environment concluded March 4, 19721 and the convention 
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
for the conservation of migratory birds and their environments 
concluded November 19, 1976. . . Id. 
8 § 707: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, 
association, partnership, or corporation who shall violate any 
provisions of said conventions or of this subchapter, or who shall 
violate or fail to comply with any regulation made pursuant to this 
subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be 
imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 
(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly-- 
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to 
sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or 
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall 
be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
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preparation of a presentence investigation report (“PSR”).9 The PSR found 
that Bertucci had a criminal history score of two and that his total offense 
level was ten.10 The PSR incorporated a four-level enhancement on the 
basis that the total “loss” amounts for the eagle and hawk exceeded 
$10,000, but did not exceed $30,000.11 The PSR also included a two-level 
enhancement for a “pattern of similar violations” because of Bertucci’s 
previous conviction for possession of bald eagle feathers, in violations of § 
668(a).12 The PSR also included several paragraphs focusing on alleged 
                                                                                                                         
(c) Whoever violates section 704(b)(2) of this title shall be fined under 
Title 18, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. 
(d) All guns, traps, nets and other equipment, vessels, vehicles, and 
other means of transportation used by any person when engaged in 
pursuing, hunting, taking, trapping, ensnaring, capturing, killing, or 
attempting to take, capture, or kill any migratory bird in violation of 
this subchapter with the intent to offer for sale, or sell, or offer for 
barter, or barter such bird in violation of this subchapter shall be 
forfeited to the United States and may be seized and held pending the 
prosecution of any person arrested for violating this subchapter and 
upon conviction for such violation, such forfeiture shall be adjudicated 
as a penalty in addition to any other provided for violation of this 
subchapter. Such forfeited property shall be disposed of and accounted 
for by, and under the authority of, the Secretary of the Interior. Id. 
Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 926.  
9 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 926.  
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 926-27.  
12 Id. at 927 (citing 16 U.S.C.S. § 668 (2015)); 16 U.S.C.S. § 668: 
(a) Prohibited acts; criminal penalties. Whoever, within the United 
States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, without being 
permitted to do so as hereinafter provided, shall knowingly, or with 
wanton disregard for the consequences of his act take, possess, sell, 
purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or 
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previous assaults committed by Bertucci.13 Bertucci objected to both 
sentence level enhancements and to the allegations of assault.14 The 
district court denied the objections and sentenced Bertucci to eight 
months’ imprisonment with one year of supervised release along with a 
$6,500 “financial obligation,”15 and mandatory anger-management 
counseling.16 The Defendant argued on appeal that the court committed 
                                                                                                                         
import, at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle commonly known 
as the American eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, 
nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any 
permit or regulation issued pursuant to this Act [16 USCS §§ 668-
668d], shall be fined not more than $ 5,000 or imprisoned not more 
than one year or both: Provided, That in the case of a second or 
subsequent conviction for a violation of this section committed after the 
date of the enactment of this proviso [Oct. 23, 1972], such person shall 
be fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both: Provided further, That the commission of each taking or other 
act prohibited by this section with respect to a bald or golden eagle 
shall constitute a separate violation of this section: Provided 
further, That one-half of any such fine, but not exceed $ 2,500, shall be 
paid to the person or persons giving information which leads to 
conviction: Provided further, That nothing herein shall be construed to 
prohibit possession or transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, or 
any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to June 8, 1940, and 
that nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or 
transportation of any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or 
egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to the addition to this Act [16 USCS 
§§ 668-668d] of the provisions relating to preservation of the golden 
eagle. Id.   
13 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 927.   
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 926 (unclear if district court meant for the “financial obligation” to be restitution 
or fine). 
16 Id. at 932-33. The court ultimately decided that the district court abused its discretion 
by requiring anger-management counseling. Id. 
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multiple procedural errors with respect to its application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, in that the sentence level was, in part, based on an incorrect 
monetary valuation of the birds.17 Bertucci also argued that court lacked 
the authority to order restitution and that the court had insufficient factual 
basis to require anger-management counseling.18 
Bertucci’s sentence level, in accordance with Sentencing 
Guidelines §§ 2Q2.1 (b) (3) (A) (ii),19 and 2B1.1 (b) (1) (C),20 was based 
on replacement costs21 of $10,000 and $1,750 for the eagle and hawk, 
                                                 
17 Id. at 927.  
18 Id.   
19 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 (2015). 
Offenses Involving Fish, Wildlife, and Plants: 
If the offense (A) involved fish, wildlife, or plants that were not 
quarantined as required by law; or (B) otherwise created a significant 
risk of infestation or disease transmission potentially harmful to 
humans, fish, wildlife, or plants increase by 2 levels. 
(3) (If more than one applies, use the greater): 
(A) If the market value of the fish, wildlife, or plants (i) exceeded 
$2,000 but did not exceed $5,000, increase by 1 level; or (ii) exceeded 
$5,000, increase by the number of levels from the table in § 2B1.1 
(Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to that amount. 
Id. 
20 § 2B1.1.   
21 § 2Q2.1:  
When information is reasonably available, “market value” under 
subsection (b)(3)(A) shall be based on the fair-market retail price. 
Where the fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain, the court may 
make a reasonable estimate using any reliable information, such as the 
reasonable replacement or restitution cost or the acquisition and 
preservation (e.g., taxidermy) cost. Market value, however, shall not be 
based on measurement of aesthetic loss (so called “contingent 
valuation” methods). Id.(emphasis added).  
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respectively.22 Bertucci argued that the district court erred by adopting “a 
flawed valuation process” to value the eagle and hawk.23 Bertucci, in 
support of his argument, noted, “that both the government and the district 
court had adopted a mere $2,000 valuation for bald eagles in the 2009 
prosecutions of both him and his brother.”24 Instead of relying on a 
valuation table prepared by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,25 
which was previously applied by this court in the 2009 prosecution of 
Bertucci, the court relied on valuations from an affidavit of Edward Clark 
Jr., President of the Wildlife Center of Virginia.26 Clark’s valuations were 
significantly higher than the valuations that the court had previously 
adopted. 27 The district court imposed a “financial obligation” of $5,000 
for the eagle in addition to $1,500 for the hawk, which was consistent with 
Clark’s valuations.28 
                                                 
22 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 927.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. See U.S. v. Bertucci, No. 8:09CR84, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119230 (D. Neb. Nov. 
25, 2009). 
25 In Re: Forfeiture of Collateral Schedule—United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 
General Order No. 96-13 (E. Tex. June 19, 1996). 
26 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 927.  
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On Appeal, the court vacated the district court’s sentence and 
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, 
finding that Clark’s valuations did “not constitute reliable evidence to 
justify the new and dramatically increased eagle and hawk valuations 
proffered.”29 Citing the Guidelines, the appellate court reasoned that when 
deciding wildlife valuations for sentencing, where fair-market price is 
difficult to ascertain, the court must only consider reliable information that 
is consistent with previous valuations or reliable information that justifies 
new valuations.30 In determining the reliability of Clark’s valuations, the 
court critically viewed Clark’s consideration of policy issues31 and the fact 
that much of the information contained in Clark’s analysis was derived 
from conversations with third parties, some of which occurred decades 
ago, making it impossible to discern the reliability of the information.32 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Sentencing Commission (the “Commission”) is 
an independent agency in the judicial branch that exists to establish 
                                                 
29 Id. at 929, 932. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 929. 
32 Id.  
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sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system to 
ensure ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the 
appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.33 The 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”) delegates broad authority to 
the Commission to review and set standards for the federal sentencing 
process.34 The Act contains “detailed instructions as to how this 
determination should be made, the most important of which directs the 
Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender 
characteristics.”35 The Commission prescribes guideline ranges specifying 
appropriate sentences for each class of convicted persons which are 
determined by coordinating the offense behavior categories with offender 
characteristic categories.36 Offense behavior categories typically describe 
details of the crime committed, whereas offender characteristic categories 
typically include details specific to the offender.37 For example, an offense 
behavior category may state “bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500 
taken,” and an offender characteristic category may state, “offender with 
                                                 
33 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1) (2015). 
34 Id. at pt. A(1)(2).  
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
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one prior conviction not resulting in imprisonment.”38 The nature of what 
is included in these categories can result in statutory sentence 
enhancements or adjustments.39 In regards to crimes involving wildlife, 
there are sentence enhancements, for example, based on the value of the 
wildlife involved in the offense and the offender’s criminal history.40 The 
sentencing court must select a sentence from within the prescribed 
guideline range.41 However, if a particular case presents atypical features, 
the court is allowed to depart from the Guidelines’ prescribed sentence 
range, so long as the court specifies in writing its reasoning.42 
The Sentencing Guidelines went into effect November 1, 1987.43 
Shortly after the implementation of the Guidelines, defendants began 
challenging the constitutionality of the Guidelines on the bases of 
improper legislative delegation and violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine.44 In Mistretta v. United States,45 the Supreme Court rejected 
                                                 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. See In Re: Forfeiture of Collateral Schedule—United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service, General Order No. 96-13 (E. Tex. June 19, 1996). 
41 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1) (2015). 
42 Id.  
43 Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, An Overview of the United States Sentencing 
Commission 2, http://isb.ussc.gov/files/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).  
44 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. 
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these challenges.46 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Commission as a judicial branch agency,47 finding that Congress did not 
delegate excessive legislative power or upset the constitutionally-
mandated balance of powers among the coordinate branches of 
government.48 Since their implementation in 1989, federal judges have 
sentenced more than a million defendants using the Guidelines.49 
According to the Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for 
offenses involving fish, wildlife, or plants is six.50 In the Bertucci case, the 
presentence investigation report (“PSR”) concluded that Bertucci had a 
criminal history score of two and incorporated a four-level enhancement 
under the Sentencing Guidelines because the “total ‘loss’ amounts for the 
eagle and hawk exceeded $10,000 but did not exceed $30,000.”51 The PSR 
also incorporated a two-level enhancement for Bertucci’s pattern of 
similar violations because of his 2009 conviction52 for possession of bald 
                                                                                                                         
45 Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
46 Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 43, at 2; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. 
47 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. 
48 Id. 
49 Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 43, at 2.    
50 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 (2015). 
51 U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 926 (8th Cir. 2015). 
52 Id. See U.S. v. Bertucci, No. 8:09CR84, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119230 (D. Neb. Nov. 
25, 2009). 
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eagle feathers.53 With the statutory enhancements based on his criminal 
history and the value of the “total loss” resulting from his offense, 
Bertucci’s total offense level was ten.54 The enhancements are important 
in this case because if the court had used the $2,000 valuation for the 
harmed wildlife that the state and the district court had used in Bertucci’s 
previous 2009 prosecution,55 his offense sentence level, and thus, his 
ultimate sentence would have been less.56 
In regards to the “market value” of wildlife, the Sentencing 
Guidelines are clear that “when information is reasonably available, 
‘market value’. . . shall be based on the fair-market retail price.”57 Where 
the fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain, the court may make a 
reasonable estimate using any reliable information, such as the reasonable 
replacement or restitution cost or the acquisition and preservation (e.g., 
taxidermy) cost.”58 Bertucci is centered around the question of what 
counts as reliable information for a reasonable estimate.59 
                                                 
53 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 927. 
54 Id. at 926. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 928. 
57 Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 cmt. n. 4 (2015)). 
58 Id. (emphasis added). 
59 Id. 
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In United States v. Oehlenschlager,60 the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, similar to the Bertucci case, was tasked with determining a “fair-
market retail price” of wildlife.61 The defendant, Oehlenschlager, plead 
guilty to illegally importing wildlife and aiding and abetting the illegal 
importation of wildlife in foreign commerce.62 In Oehlenschlager, the 
defendant illegally imported “36 White-Winged Scoter eggs, 100 
American Goldeneye eggs, 13 Red-breasted Merganser eggs, 50 Common 
Merganser eggs, and 1 Sandhill Crane.”63 The government argued the 
value of the eggs was established by the value of the adult version of the 
respective species.64 For these values, the government referred to the 
defendant’s own price list for resale, which valued adult ducks at over 
$50,000.”65 Giving the eggs the adult value would have enhanced the 
offense level by five points according to the Guidelines.66 The defendant 
argued that this method of valuation would be unfair due to high egg 
                                                 
60 U.S. v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1996). 
61 Id. at 229. 
62 Id. at 228.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 229. 
65 Id. at 230. 
66 Id. at 229 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(F) (2015)). 
 171 
mortality rates.67 The court was not persuaded by this argument.68 Rather, 
the court found it reasonable to value illegally imported water bird eggs, 
for which there was no reasonably available market price, as the value that 
defendant himself placed on the live birds, i.e. the profits that he intended 
to realize from his illegal activity. 69 The court utilized the defendant’s 
price list for the wildlife rather than the valuation table prepared by the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Services used in Bertucci.  
Additionally, in United States v. Asper,70 Paul Asper was charged 
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Title 16, United States Code, 
§§ 1531-1543,71 and Title 18, United States Code, § 545,72 and 2.7374 
                                                 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 230.  
69 Id. 
70 U.S. v. Asper, 753 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
71 16 U.S.C.S. § 1531 (2015): 
(a) Findings. The Congress finds and declares that-- 
(1)  various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States 
have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and 
development untempered by adequate concern and conservation; 
(2)  other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in 
numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction; 
(3)  these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation 
and its people; 
(4)  the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the 
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the 
various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction, pursuant 
to-- 
(A)  migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico; 
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Asper was charged for the unlawful possession of animal body parts under 
16 U.S.C. § 1538(c)(1) and 1504(b)(1).75 Six species of wildlife involving 
nine animals were the subjects of the charges.7677 The District Court of 
                                                                                                                         
(B)  the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan; 
(C)  the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in 
the Western Hemisphere; 
(D)  the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; 
(E)  the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the 
North Pacific Ocean; 
(F)  the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora; and 
(G)  other international agreements; and 
(5)  encouraging the States and other interested parties, through Federal 
financial assistance and a system of incentives, to develop and maintain 
conservation programs which meet national and international standards 
is a key to meeting the Nation's international commitments and to 
better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation's heritage. 
Id.  
72 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012) provides in part: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United 
States, smuggles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States any 
merchandise which should have been invoiced. . . .Whoever 
fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any 
merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any 
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such 
merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been 
imported or brought into the United states contrary to law. . .[S]hall be 
fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both. Id. 
73 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) provides: 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, 
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal. 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United 
States, is punishable as a principal. Id. 
74 Asper, 753 F. Supp. at 1263. 
75 Id.   
76 Id.  
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Pennsylvania found that “where market value is difficult to ascertain, a 
district court may use a reasonable method to measure loss . . . and is not 
limited to a strict market valuation of loss.”78 Further, the court found that 
when determining the market value of wildlife, when there is no legal 
market for endangered wildlife, the court may consider the appraisal of 
taxidermists, based on the cost of replacement and acquisition of the 
wildlife and other data.79 The court in Asper, considered the testimony of a 
curator at the Carnegie Museum credible in regards to the effect the 
killings had on the world population of the wildlife.80 Four witnesses also 
testified regarding the value of wildlife: an experienced auctioneer, an 
appraiser, and two taxidermists.81 The court considered factors such as the 
cost of acquisition or replacement, profit, scientific value, artistic value, 
and rarity when determining valuations.82 Ultimately, the court utilized a 
                                                                                                                         
77 Id. The animals involved, included: Serows, a Jentink’s Duiker, a Black-faced Impala, 
an African Wild Dog, Gorals, and Huemuls. Id.  
78 Id. at 1281. 
79 Id. at 1281-82. 
80 Id. at 1282. 
81 Id. at 1270. 
82 Id.  
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valuation based on cost of acquisition, scientific value, and rarity 
persuasive, adjusting the taxidermist’s values as the court saw fit.83  
In another factually similar case,  United States v. Ross,84 the 
defendant was found guilty on four counts of aiding and abetting in the 
unlawful taking of various species of hawks under 16 U.S.C. §§ 70385 and 
707(a).8687 Sixteen hawk remains were recovered from a garbage dump on 
                                                 
83 Id. at 1282. 
84 U.S. v. Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146285 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2012). 
85 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012): 
(a) In general 
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter 
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any 
means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to 
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, 
offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, 
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, 
transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or 
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory 
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or 
not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of 
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of 
the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for the 
protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 
1702), the United States and the United Mexican States for the 
protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February 
7, 1936, the United States and the Government of Japan for the 
protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and 
their environment concluded March 4, 1972 and the convention 
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
for the conservation of migratory birds and their environments 
concluded November 19, 1976. Id. 
86 § 707(a): 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association, 
partnership, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said 
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the defendant’s property in addition to feather fragments at another site on 
his property.88 The court reasoned that determining the value of each hawk 
would be “difficult, if not impossible, because federal law makes it 
unlawful to sell, barter, purchase, ship, import, export, deliver, or transport 
hawks,” meaning, there is no marketplace, and thus no market value, for 
them.89 The court utilized the determinations reached by another court in 
the district which fixed the value of hawks at $1,750.90 The court found 
“the testimony of Edward Clark, who appeared as an expert witness in 
another Migratory Bird Treaty Act case, is also instructive. In that case, 
the presiding District Judge found Mr. Clark's valuation opinions to be 
both credible and reliable.”91 The Ross court agreed with the other judge’s 
findings and adopted Clark’s valuations.92 Ultimately, the court ordered 
                                                                                                                         
conventions or of this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to comply 
with any regulation made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not 
more than $15,000 or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 
Id. 
87 Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146285, at *1 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2012). 
88 Id. at *13-14.  
89 Id. at *14.  
90 Id. at *14-15.  
91 Id. at *15. 
92 Id.  
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the defendant to pay Clark’s valuation of $1,750 per hawk for a total 
restitution amount of $28,000.93 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit found the trial court erred in applying § 2Q2.1,94 finding 
that Clark’s valuations from the affidavit did not constitute sufficiently 
reliable evidence to justify the new and increased eagle and hawk 
valuations.95 Finding the defendant’s argument persuasive, the court noted 
that “the District of Nebraska (the district court in this case) has 
specifically adopted the Valuation Table96 to establish the replacement 
                                                 
93 Id. at *16. 
94 Critically, with respect to the "market value" of the wildlife, Application Note 4 to § 
2Q2.1 clarifies that: 
When information is reasonably available, "market value" . . . shall be 
based on the fair-market retail price. Where the fair-market retail price 
is difficult to ascertain, the court may make a reasonable estimate using 
any reliable information, such as the reasonable replacement or 
restitution cost or the acquisition and preservation (e.g., taxidermy) 
cost. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, even assuming there was no "reasonably 
available" information to determine the "fair-market retail price" of the 
bald eagle and rough-legged hawk (which the district court implicitly 
found), substitute estimates must nevertheless be "reasonable" and 
based on "reliable information." With this procedural safeguard in 
mind, we now analyze the reliability of the valuation-related evidence 
in the record before us. 
U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2015). 
95 Id. at 929.  
96 In Re: Forfeiture of Collateral Schedule—United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 
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values of various types of birds — including eagles and hawks.”97 The 
court found the state failed to prove how the value of an eagle quintupled 
between 2009, when the court used the Valuation Table’s $2,000 
valuation, and 2014, when the government asked the court to use Clark’s 
valuation of $10,000.98 The court further emphasized the testimony of a 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service special agent who testified that 
“bald eagles were recently taken off the endangered species list”99 and that 
it would be proper to “assume that their populations are growing,” making 
the point that increased endangered-ness could not be the reasoning behind 
the increase in value.100  
Further, the court also found Clark’s affidavit to contain 
weaknesses which, according to the court, cast doubt on the affidavit’s 
reliability.101 For instance, the court noted that the affidavit suggested 
Clark may have structured his analysis and high valuations to comport 
with his own beliefs that a bird’s replacement value should be deemed to 
                                                                                                                         
General Order No. 96-13 (E. Tex. June 19, 1996). 
97 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
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exceed the bird’s average rehabilitation costs as a legal policy matter.102 
The court noted that although Clark may be correct in his conclusion that 
ensuring replacement costs exceed average rehabilitation costs constitutes 
good legal policy, Clark’s “proper role in submitting the affidavit was 
limited to assessing the true valuations of the birds per the Guidelines and 
not assessing what valuations would make for good policy.”103 The court 
also noted that Clark’s affidavit discussed irrelevant valuations ranging 
from $475, the market price valuation of a Kestrel in Great Britain, to 
$50,000, the estimated process to propagate and release a California 
Condor.104 The court further took issue with the fact that Clark 
subjectively factored in eagle and hawk “scarcity and roles in the 
ecosystem” in order to arrive at his final estimated replacement costs.105 
                                                 
102 Id. at 928-29. As Clark averred: 
In considering replacement cost within the context of illegal activity, I 
feel strongly that the ultimate determination of that cost should not 
inadvertently create an incentive to kill the affected birds rather than to 
simply displace or injure them. . . . Therefore, even in the absence of a 
comparable market value or propagation cost upon which to base the 
replacement value of dead birds, a determination of reasonable 
restitution payments can be reached by beginning with the average cost 
to properly care for, rehabilitate and release to the wild an individual 
bird of the affected species . . . . Then, this cost basis can be adjusted to 
account for [other] factors. Id.  
103 Id. at 929. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A) (2015).  
104 Bertucci, 795 F.3d at 929. 
105 Id.  
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The court also found that because much of the information used in Clark’s 
analyses was derived from decades old, third party conversations which he 
may not have been present during, it was impossible to discern how Clark 
learned of the information or its reliability.106 The court ruled that Clark’s 
valuations did not constitute sufficiently reliable evidence to justify the 
increased valuations proffered by the government in this case.107 Thus, the 
court remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion.108 
V. COMMENT 
According to § 2Q2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, “where the 
fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain, the court may make a 
reasonable estimate using any reliable information, such as the reasonable 
replacement or restitution cost or the acquisition and preservation (e.g., 
taxidermy) cost.”109 Bertucci puts this comment in the Guidelines to the 
test in the Eighth Circuit. In this case, the government sought out Edward 
E. Clark Jr., co-founder and president of the Wildlife Center of Virginia, 
to submit an affidavit on how to properly value the eagle and hawk for 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 932.  
109 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 cmt. n. 4 (2015)(emphasis added). 
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sentencing purposes.110 The Wildlife Center of Virginia is considered one 
of the world’s leading teaching and research hospitals for native wildlife 
and has treated nearly 60,000 wild animals, representing over 200 species 
since its founding in 1982.111 Birds of prey, like those at issue in Bertucci, 
represent about 10-15 percent of the hospital’s intake.112  
Clark has experience in drafting legislation and regulation 
governing the use of natural resources and the use and possession of 
wildlife.113 Over the last 24 years, Clark assisted both state and federal law 
enforcement in establishing reasonable replacement costs for illegally 
taken wildlife, including eagles and other birds of prey.114 His wildlife 
replacement costs in cases involving crimes in violation of the Migratory 
Bird Act have been used in Carrolton, Texas; Little Rock, Arkansas; and 
in Charlottesville, Virginia.115 He also consulted with nearly a dozen state 
wildlife agencies along with congressional and legislative staff on a wide 
                                                 
110 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928. 
111 Affidavit of Edward E. Clark Jr., President, Wildlife Center of Virginia (Oct. 29, 






variety of wildlife and enforcement issues.116 Clark received national 
recognition for his work, including: the Chuck Yeager Award from the 
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation and designation as one of 500 
Environmental Achievers by the U.S. committee for the UN Environment 
Programme.117 Additionally, in 2007, the Wildlife Center of Virginia was 
named Conservation Organization of the Year for the United States.118  
Clark’s affidavit outlined the factors he considered when 
determining a reasonable replacement cost of birds of prey protected under 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: “1) the cost of captive propagation, 
conditioning and release to the wild of relevant species, 2) the cost of 
treating, rehabilitating and restoring to health, an individual victim of the 
type of crime committed (shooting, poisoning, trapping), and 3) the 
market value of an individual from the affected species, or similar species, 
where a legal commerce in these birds exists.”119 Clark stated “for the 
purposes of this affidavit, the replacement value will be the cost to simply 
produce or restore an individual bird that can exist as a living, 






functioning, wild creature in its normal habitat. No effort is made to 
assign or assess the specific value of that animal's role in the 
ecosystem.”120 
The court criticized Clark’s valuations, in part because he included 
“policy” concerns in his valuation process.121 Clark’s experience with 
wildlife legislation, as well as his founding and working for the Wildlife 
Center, make him a reliable and qualified source, if not more qualified 
than the court, to determine these valuations. Accordingly, his policy 
considerations are reliable and should be taken seriously. Clark worked 
with wildlife in rehabilitating and reintroducing them into their 
environments; his policy concerns are those the court should consider in 
valuing wildlife. It is difficult to imagine what harm could come from the 
court being more inclusive when considering factors to value wildlife. 
                                                 
120 Id.(emphasis added). 
121 U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 928-29 (8th Cir. 2015). As Clark averred: 
In considering replacement cost within the context of illegal activity, I feel 
strongly that the ultimate determination of that cost should not inadvertently 
create an incentive to kill the affected birds rather than to simply displace or 
injure them. . . . 
Therefore, even in the absence of a comparable market value or propagation cost 
upon which to base the replacement value of dead birds, a determination of 
reasonable restitution payments can be reached by beginning with the average 
cost to properly care for, rehabilitate and release to the wild an individual bird of 
the affected species . . . . Then, this cost basis can be adjusted to account for 
[other] factors . . . . Id. 
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Clark emphasizes a very important policy concern that should be 
addressed by the court: putting the replacement value of a dead bird below 
the value to restore a bird will only encourage defendants to kill the birds 
after merely injuring one in an effort to avoid harsher punishment.122 This 
policy issue is obvious, but important, and, if not already considered by 
the court when making valuation decisions, it should be. Therefore, the 
mere fact that Clark discussed policy considerations should not disqualify 
his suggestions for valuing the wildlife  
Other courts in the United States have found Clark’s valuation 
“credible and reliable.”123 In fact, the court in Ross relied solely on Clark’s 
valuations.124 The Ross court suggested the entire district had accepted 
Clark’s valuations of hawks.125 Further, Clark’s wildlife valuations have 
been used in Carrolton, Texas; Little Rock, Arkansas; and in 
Charlottesville, Virginia.126 The Eighth Circuit should follow these courts 
and use Clark’s expert wildlife valuations.  
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 See U.S. v. Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146285, at *15 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2012).  
124 Id. 
125 Id.  
126 Affidavit of Edward E. Clark Jr., President, Wildlife Center of Virginia (Oct. 29, 
2014) (on file with author). 
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One of the methods of valuation used by the Eight Circuit, and 
demonstrated by the Oehlenschlager court, is logically flawed. In the 
Oehlenschlager case, rather than relying on the valuation table prepared 
by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service applied in Bertucci,127 or 
allowing the valuations to be based on a highly qualified and 
knowledgeable expert, the Eighth Circuit relied on the defendant’s 
handwritten price list when valuing the illegally imported wildlife.128 It is 
counter-intuitive that the court would look to a wildlife offender’s 
projected profit to determine how wildlife should be valued. Offenders, 
whether buyers or sellers, do not take into consideration the cost to replace 
an animal in the environment or the costs to rehabilitate an injured animal 
so that it may be re-introduced into its environment. Offenders do not 
appreciate the impact that removing an animal will have on the rest of the 
environment. It seems obvious that Clark is immensely more qualified and 
capable to determine the true value of wildlife than an offender convicted 
of a crime against wildlife.  
                                                 
127 Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 929.   
128 U.S. v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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Additionally, the court in Asper found that taxidermists were 
capable of determining the replacement valuations of endangered wildlife 
based on the cost of acquisition, scientific value, and rarity.129 After seeing 
first-hand what it actually costs to replace or rehabilitate wildlife from his 
work at the Wildlife Foundation, surely, Clark’s valuations are more 
reliable and more inclusive than a taxidermist’s. Although, the Asper case 
dealt with valuing endangered species of wildlife, it is difficult to find a 
legal reason that supports the idea that some wildlife crimes are worse 
than others just because of the species involved.   
I criticize the court in Bertucci for not being more inclusive of 
other factors when it comes to the valuations of the eagle and hawk. Using 
the wildlife valuation table just for the sake of being consistent 
underestimates the true value of wildlife.  After reviewing the wildlife 
valuation table created by the Department of the Interior’s Fish and 
Wildlife Service, it is unclear what factors the Department considered 
when creating the valuations. Seeing that the court in Bertucci stands for 
the proposition that strict application of the valuation table is required, I 
wonder how long the court will consider this table to be accurate. I wonder 
                                                 
129 U.S. v. Asper, 753 F. Supp. 1260, 1281 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
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what will happen in regards to the valuation table if we see significant 
inflation or a sudden influx in wildlife related crime. The Bertucci 
decision does not answer these questions. Being consistent just for the 
sake of being consistent, as the court ruled in Bertucci, underestimates 
wildlife value and in turn harms our country’s wildlife. 
While the implications of the court’s decision to strictly adhere to 
the Wildlife Foundation’s valuation table are not obvious and immediate, 
there are concerns that offenders, especially repeat offenders like the 
defendant in Bertucci, will continue to harm or take wildlife illegally, 
while calculating the risks and future punishments involved with the 
crime. The deterrence goal of punishment will not be achieved because 
offenders will likely continue to commit crimes against wildlife at a level 
that will cover their costs if they are caught by law enforcement, 
evidenced by Mr. Bertucci’s pattern of repeated illegal wildlife behavior. 
The court should have taken a more inclusive stance and considered 
Clark’s exceedingly reliable valuations when determining the values of the 





Bertucci represents the proposition that the valuation table created 
by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service is the correct method of 
valuation in instances where the market value of wildlife is difficult to 
ascertain. However, it seems the court only applied this valuation method 
for the sake of staying consistent with Mr. Bertucci’s previous conviction 
in 2009. In doing so, the court demonstrates how this method of valuation 
fails to deter offenders from recommitting the same crimes involving 
wildlife. Mr. Bertucci was not deterred by the sentence he received in 
2009, which was based on the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
valuation table.  This obvious lack of deterrence is a concerning 
implication of the Bertucci case. 
The court should have utilized Clark’s expert replacement 
valuations, which were based on years of experience working to restore 
birds to their natural habitat, and should have been more inclusive in 
considering factors when valuing wildlife in order to deter wildlife 
offenders from re-offending.  
KATIELEE KITCHEN



